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The emergence of cooperation in populations of selﬁsh individu-
als is a fascinating topic that has inspired much work in theoretical
biology. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in a model
where individuals are characterized by phenotypic properties that
are visible to others. The population is well mixed in the sense
that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else, but
the behavioral strategies can depend on distance in phenotype
space. We study the interaction of cooperators and defectors. In
our model, cooperators cooperate with those who are similar and
defect otherwise. Defectors always defect. Individuals mutate to
nearby phenotypes, which generates a random walk of the popu-
lation in phenotype space. Our analysis brings together ideas from
coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain
a precise condition for natural selection to favor cooperators over
defectors. Cooperation is favored when the phenotypic mutation
rate is large and the strategy mutation rate is small. In the optimal
case for cooperators, in a one-dimensional phenotype space and
for large population size, the critical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio is given
by b/c = 1 + 2/
√
3. We also derive the fundamental condition for
any two-strategy symmetric game and consider high-dimensional
phenotype spaces.
coalescent theory | evolutionary dynamics | evolutionary game theory |
mathematical biology | stochastic process
E
volutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent
selection (1–8). Fitness values depend on the relative abun-
dance, or frequency, of various strategies in the population, for
example, the frequency of cooperators and defectors. Evolution-
ary game theory has been applied to understand the evolution
of cooperative interactions in viruses, bacteria, plants, animals,
and humans (9–13). The classical approach to evolutionary game
dynamicsassumeswell-mixedpopulations,whereeveryindividual
is equally likely to interact with every other individual (4). Recent
advances include the extension to populations that are structured
by geography or other factors (14–25).
The term “greenbeard effect” was coined in sociobiology to
describe the result of the following thought experiment (26, 27).
Whatevolutionarydynamicswilloccurifasinglegeneisresponsi-
bleforbothaphenotypicsignal(“agreenbeard”)andabehavioral
response (for example, altruistic behavior toward individuals with
like phenotypes)? Later, the term “armpit effect” was introduced
(28)torefertoaself-referentphenotypethatisusedinidentifying
kin (29–31).
Both of these concepts are now seen as cases of “tag-based
cooperation,” in which a generic system of phenotypic tags is used
to indicate similarity or difference, and the evolutionary dynam-
ics of cooperation are studied in the context of these tags. A ﬁrst
approach, based on computer simulations, assumed a well-mixed
population, a continuum of tags, and an evolving threshold dis-
tance for cooperation (32). More recent models use numerical
and analytic methods and often combine tags with viscous pop-
ulation structure (33–37). A general ﬁnding of these articles is
that it is difﬁcult to obtain cooperation in tag-based models for
well-mixed populations, indicating that some spatial structure is
needed (14).
Inspired by work on tag-based cooperation (32–34, 38) and
building on a previous approach (39), we study evolutionary game
dynamics in a model where the behavior depends on phenotypic
distance(40,41).Asaparticularexampleweexploretheevolution
of cooperation (42, 43). Studies of different organisms, including
humans, support the idea that cooperation is more likely among
similar individuals (31, 44–49). Our model applies to situations
where individuals tend to like those who have similar attitudes
and beliefs. We introduce a natural model in which individuals
mutate to adjacent phenotypes in a possibly multidimensional
phenotype space. We study one and inﬁnitely many dimensions
indetail.Wedevelopatheoryforgeneralevolutionarygames,not
just the evolution of cooperation. Spatial structure is not needed
for cooperation to be favored in our model. Moreover, in con-
trast to previous work (39), we develop an analytic machinery for
describing heterogeneous populations in phenotype space.
Consider a population of asexual haploid individuals, with a
population size N that is constant over time. Each individual is
characterized by a phenotype, given by an integer i that can take
anyvaluefromminustoplusinﬁnity.Thus,thisphenotypespaceis
a one-dimensional and unbounded lattice. Individuals inherit the
phenotype of their parent subject to some small variation. If the
parent’sphenotypeisi,thentheoffspringhasphenotypei−1,i,or
i+1withprobabilitiesv,1−2v,andv,respectively.Theparameter
v can vary between 0 and 1/2.
LetusconsideraWright–Fisherprocess.Ineachgeneration,all
individuals produce the same large number of offspring. The next
generationofN individualsissampledfromthispoolofoffspring.
To introduce some fundamental concepts and quantities, we ﬁrst
studythemodelwithoutanyselection.Noevolutionarygameisyet
being played, and there is only neutral drift in phenotype space.
The entire population performs a random walk with a diffusion
coefﬁcient v, and by this process will tend to disperse over the lat-
tice. In opposition to this, all of the individuals in the population
will be, to some degree, related due to reproduction in a ﬁnite
population.Thus,whileoccasionallythepopulationmaybreakup
into two or more clusters, typically there is only a single cluster
(50, 51). The standard deviation of the distribution in phenotype
space, which is a measure for the width of the cluster, is
√
2Nv.
Next, we superimpose the neutral drift of two types: the strate-
gies A and B (Fig. 1). Still for the moment, assuming no ﬁtness
differences, we have reproduction subject to mutation between
A and B. Speciﬁcally, with probability u the offspring adopts a
random strategy. The mutation–reproduction process deﬁnes a
stationary distribution (52). If u is very small relative to N, the
population tends to be either all-A or all-B.I fu is large, the pop-
ulation tends toward one-half A and one-half B. Fig. 2 illustrates
the random walk in phenotype space of the population composed
of the two types A and B.
Author contributions: T.A., H.O., J.W., P.D.T., and M.A.N. performed research; and T.A.,
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www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0902528106 PNAS May 26, 2009 vol. 106 no. 21 8597–8600Fig. 1. The basic geometry of evolution in phenotype space. There are two
types of individuals (red and blue), which can refer to arbitrary traits or dif-
ferent strategies in an evolutionary game. Individuals inherit the strategy of
their parent subject to a small mutation rate u. Moreover, each individual has
a phenotype. Here, we consider a discrete one-dimensional phenotype space.
An individual of phenotype i produces offspring of phenotype i−1, i,o ri+1
with probabilities v,1− 2v, and v, respectively. The total population (of size
N) performs a random walk in phenotype space with diffusion coefﬁcient
v. Sometimes the cluster breaks into two or more pieces, but typically only
one of them survives. If evolutionary updating occurs according to a Wright–
Fisher process then the distribution of individuals in phenotype space has a
standard deviation of
√
2Nv. For the Moran process, the standard deviation
is reduced to
√
Nv.
By using coalescence theory (53, 54) many interesting and rel-
evant properties of the distributions of both the strategies and
phenotypic tags can be calculated. For example, the probabil-
ity that two randomly chosen individuals have the same pheno-
type is z = 1/
√
8Nv. The probability that two randomly chosen
individuals have the same strategy and the same phenotype is
g = z(1 − Nu/2). The probability that two individuals have the
same strategy and a third individual has the same phenotype as
thesecondish = z[1−Nu(2+
√
3)/4].Theseresultsholdforlarge
population size N and small mutation rate u; more precisely, we
assume large Nv and small Nu. The relevance of z, g, and h will
become clear below. The expressions for z, g, and h are derived
for general Nv and Nu in supporting information (SI) Appendix,
where they appear as Eqs. 10, 19, and 24, respectively.
We can now use these insights to study game dynamics. We
investigate the competition of cooperators, C, and defectors, D.
Cooperators play a conditional strategy: they cooperate with all
individuals who are close enough in phenotype space and defect
otherwise.Thenotionofbeingcloseenoughismodeledbyalattice
structure. In particular, a cooperator with phenotype i cooperates
only with other individuals of phenotype i. Defectors, in contrast,
play an unconditional strategy: they always defect. Cooperation
meanspayingacost,c,fortheotherindividualtoreceiveabeneﬁt
b. The larger the total payoff of an individual, interacting equally
with every member of the population, the larger the number of
offspring it will produce on average. We want to calculate the crit-
ical beneﬁt-to-cost ratio, b/c, that allows the game in phenotype
space to favor the evolution of cooperation.
Aconﬁgurationofthepopulationisspeciﬁedbymi andni,which
arethenumberofcooperatorswithphenotypeiandthetotalnum-
ber of individuals with phenotype i, respectively. The total payoff
of all cooperators is FC =

i mi(bmi−cni). The total payoff of all
defectors is FD =

i(ni − mi)bmi. There are

i mi cooperators
and N −

i mi defectors. The average payoff for a cooperator is
fC = FC/

i mi.TheaveragepayoffforadefectorisfD = FD/(N− 
i mi).CooperatorshaveahigherﬁtnessthandefectorsiffC > fD,
which leads to

i mi(bmi−cni) >

i mi

j mjnj(b−c)/N. Aver-
agingthesequantitiesovereverypossibleconﬁgurationofthepop-
ulation, weighted by their stationary probability under neutrality,
we obtain the fundamental condition
b


i
m2
i

− c


i
mini

> (b − c)


ij
mimjnj

/N. [1]
Under this condition cooperators are more abundant than defec-
tors in the mutation-selection process. The above argument and
our results are valid in the weak selection limit. A precise deriva-
tion of this inequality is presented in SI Appendix. Correlation
termssimilartotheonesabovesometimesariseinstudiesofsocial
behavior and population dynamics (26, 55). The ﬁrst two terms
in inequality (Eq. 1) are pairwise correlations, while the third is
notably a triplet correlation. Note that the argument leading to
inequality (Eq. 1) includes self-interaction, but that the effect of
this becomes negligible when N is large.
When the population size is large, the averages in inequality
(Eq. 1) are proportional to the probabilities g, z, and h respec-
tively, which we introduced earlier. Consequently, inequality (Eq.
1) can be written as bg − cz > (b − c)h. Using the values of z,g,
and h given above we obtain
b/c > 1 +
2
√
3
, [2]
Fig. 2. Random walks in phenotype space. Shown are two computer simu-
lations of a Wright–Fisher process in a one-dimensional discrete phenotype
space. The phenotypic mutation rate is v = 0.25. The colors, red and blue,
refer to arbitrary traits, because no game is yet being played. All individu-
als have the same ﬁtness. The population size is (Left) N = 10, and (Right)
N = 100. The strategy mutation probability (between red and blue) is
u = 0.004. Therefore, a given color dominates on average for 2/u = 500 gen-
erations (since new mutations arrive at rate Nu/2 and ﬁxate with probability
1/N). The standard deviation of the distribution in phenotype space is
√
2Nv.
Approximately 95% of all individuals are within 4 standard deviations. Often
the population fragments into two or several pieces, but only one branch sur-
vives in the long run. We use the statistics of these neutral “phenotypic space
walks” for calculating the fundamental conditions of evolutionary games in
the limit of weak selection.
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E
E
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
A
R
Y
E
V
O
L
U
T
I
O
N
Fig. 3. Excellent agreement between numerical simulations and analytic
calculations.Weshowthecriticalbeneﬁt-to-costratiothatisneededforcoop-
eratorstobemoreabundantthandefectorsinthestationarydistribution.We
have used a Wright–Fisher process with a phenotypic mutation rate v = 1/2
and a strategy mutation probability u = 1/(2N). The red line indicates the
result of our analytic calculation. For these parameter values the asymptotic
limit for large N is b/c = (1 + 12
√
2)/7 ≈ 2.5672. The red dots indicate the
result of numerical simulations. The gray line illustrates the critical b/c-ratio
for u → 0 with the asymptotic limit b/c = 1 + 2/
√
3 ≈ 2.1547.
which is approximately 2.16. If the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio exceeds
this number, then cooperators are more abundant than defec-
torsinthemutation-selectionprocess. Thesuccessofcooperators
resultsfromthebalanceofmovementandclusteringinphenotype
space. Inequality (Eq. 2) represents the condition for cooperators
to be more abundant than defectors in a large population when
the strategy mutation rate u is small (Nu   1) and the phenotypic
mutation rate v is large (Nv   1). In SI Appendix, we derive con-
ditions for any population size and mutation rates. Fig. 3 shows
the excellent agreement between numerical simulations and ana-
lytical calculations. In general, we ﬁnd that both lowering strategy
mutationsandincreasingphenotypicmutationsfavorcooperators.
We can expand our analysis to study any 2 × 2 game, not only
the interaction between cooperators and defectors. Consider two
strategies A and B and the general payoff matrix
AB
AR S
BT P

. [3]
The payoffs for A versus A, A versus B, B versus A, and B versus
B are given by R, S, T, P, respectively. A players use strategy A
againstotherindividualswiththesamephenotype,otherwisethey
use B. B players always use strategy B. For the game in a one-
dimensional phenotype space and large population size we ﬁnd
that A is more abundant than B if
(R − P)(1 +
√
3) > T − S. [4]
For the derivation see Section 5.2 in the SI Appendix. This for-
mula can be used for evaluating any two-strategy symmetric game
in a one-dimensional phenotype space. In the SI Appendix,w e
discuss the snow-drift game and the stag-hunt game as particular
examples.
Wecanalsostudyhigher-dimensionalphenotypespaces.Ingen-
eral,forhigherdimensions,itiseasierforcooperatorstoovercome
defectors. The intuitive reason is that in higher dimensions phe-
notypicidentityalsoimpliesstrategicidentity.InSection5.3ofthe
SI Appendix, we show that, in the limit of inﬁnitely many dimen-
sions, and under the same assumptions that produced conditions
2and4,thecrucialbeneﬁt-to-costratiointhePrisoner’sDilemma
converges to b/c > 1. For general games, the equivalent result of
condition4becomesR > P,whichmeanstheevolutionaryprocess
always chooses the strategy with the higher payoff against itself.
Our basic approach can also be adapted to continuous, rather
than discrete, phenotype spaces. In this case, no two individuals
have exactly the same phenotype, but the conditional behavioral
strategy is triggered by sufﬁcient phenotypic similarity.
In summary, we have developed a model for the evolution
of cooperation based on phenotypic similarity. Our approach
builds on previous ideas of tag-based cooperation, but in con-
trast to earlier work (33–37), we do not need spatial population
dynamics to obtain an advantage for cooperators. We derive a
completely analytic theory that provides general insights. We ﬁnd
thattheabundanceofcooperatorsinthemutation-selectionequi-
librium is an increasing function of the phenotypic mutation rate
and a decreasing function of the strategic mutation rate. These
observations agree with the basic intuition that higher phenotypic
mutation rates reduce the interactions between cooperators and
defectors,whereashigherstrategicmutationratesdestabilizeclus-
tersofcooperatorsbyallowingfrequentinvasionofnewlymutated
defectors. Therefore, cooperation is more likely to evolve if the
strategymutationrateissmallandifthephenotypicmutationrate
is large. In a genetic model this assumption may be fulﬁlled if the
strategyisencodedbyoneorafewgenes,whereasthephenotypeis
encodedbymanygenes.Alsoinaculturalmodel,itcanbethecase
that the phenotypic mutation rates are higher than the strategic
mutation rates; for example, people might ﬁnd it easier to mod-
ify their superﬁcial appearance than their fundamental behaviors.
Furthermore, we show how the correlations between strategies
and phenotypes can be obtained from neutral coalescence theory
under the assumption that selection is weak (54, 56). Our the-
ory can be applied to study any evolutionary game in the context
of conditional behavior that is based on phenotypic similarity or
difference.
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1. Model
Consider a population of N haploid individuals (players). Each individual k = 1;:::;N
has an integer-valued phenotype Xk 2 Z, which we also refer to as its position in phenotype
space. Additionally, each individual has a strategy Sk 2 f0;1g, and we refer to these two
strategies as cooperation (1) and defection (0). In general, players' phenotypes and strategies
determine their tness.
We study the Wright-Fisher (W-F) process, where each of the N individuals of the next
generation independently chooses a parent from the previous generation with a probability
proportional to the parent's tness. Each ospring inherits the parent's position (phenotype)
with probability 1 2v, and it is placed to either the left or the right neighboring position of
the parent, both with probability v. Each ospring also inherits the parent's strategy with
probability 1   u, and it adopts a random strategy with probability u.
12 TIBOR ANTAL, HISASHI OHTSUKI, JOHN WAKELEY, PETER D. TAYLOR, MARTIN A. NOWAK
We derive the condition for cooperation to be favored in the large population size limit.
This condition depends on certain correlations in the neutral case, that is when each individ-
ual has the same tness. These correlations are calculated in Section 2. Then in Section 3
the condition for cooperation is derived. In Section 4 we discuss nite population sizes,
cooperation without self interaction, and a precise derivation of the correlations. Finally
in Section 5 as generalizations of our model we consider the Moran process, general payo
matrices, and we discuss an innite dimensional phenotype space.
2. Correlations in the neutral case
In this section we consider the neutral case, that is when all players have the same tness.
Note that the strategies and the phenotypes of the individuals change independently, and
evolve according to the Wright-Fisher process [1, 2]. The system rapidly reaches a stationary
state where the individuals stay in a cluster with variance 2Nv, but the cluster as a whole
diuses over the space (the integers) with diusion coecient v. We are interested in the
properties of this stationary state.
We are particularly interested in four probabilities. We pick three distinct individuals k, q,
and l from the population in the stationary state. For their phenotypes and their strategies
we dene the following four probabilities
y = Pr(Sk = Sq)
z = Pr(Xk = Xq)
g = Pr(Sk = Sq; Xk = Xq)
h = Pr(Sl = Sk; Xk = Xq)
(1)
In words, y is the probability that two individuals have the same strategy, and z is the
probability that they have the same phenotype. They have simultaneously the same strategy
and phenotype with probability g. Out of three individuals, the probability that the rst two
have the same phenotype, and simultaneously the rst and the third have the same strategy
is denoted by h. Note that neither g nor h factorizes in general.
To obtain the above probabilities we have to know the probability Pr(T = t) that the
time T to the most recent common ancestor (MRCA) of two randomly chosen individual is
T = t. This time is not aected by either the strategies or the phenotypes of the players.
It is determined solely by the W-F dynamics. The ancestry of two individuals coalesce with
probability 1=N in each time step. Hence the probability that the time to the MRCA is t is
(2) Pr(T = t) =

1  
1
N
t 1 1
N
We can continue the calculation for nite system size N, but the expressions become
cumbersome. Hence we relegated the nite N calculations to Section 4.1, where we mainly
treat the special v = 1=2 case. In this section we discuss the large population limit N ! 1,
where we introduce the rescaled time  = t=N. In this limit we can use a continuous time
description, where the coalescent time distribution (2) is given by the density function
(3) p() = e
 
and the average coalescence time becomes  = 1 in the new unit.
Due to the non-overlapping generations in the W-F model, each individual is a newborn
and has the chance to mutate both in strategy and phenotype space. In the large N andEVOLUTION OF COOPERATION BY PHENOTYPIC SIMILARITY 3
u;v ! 0 limit, the system can be described as a continuous time process. Strategy mutations
arrive at rate  = 2Nu and phenotype mutations at rate  = 2Nv (in each direction) on
the ancestral line of two individuals. Note that this continuous time limit is exact for the
Moran process even for nite values of v, as it is shown in Section 5.1. In the W-F model,
for nite values of v we have a discrete time random walk, but the typical number of steps
goes to innity. In that limit the discrete and continuous time walks become identical, and
hence the nite v behavior can be recovered as the  ! 1 limit.
2.1. Phenotypic distance. Let us rst study the phenotypes of the players. Here we
calculate not only z, but in general the probability that two randomly chosen individuals k
and q are at distance x in phenotype space
(4) z(x) = Pr(Xk   Xq = x)
We know that the (signed) distance between the two individuals changes by plus or minus
one at rate , and the distance distribution after time  can be expressed in terms of the
Modied Bessel functions [3, 4] as
(5) (xj) = e
 2Ijxj(2)
The probability that two individuals are distance x apart is
(6) z(x) =
1 X
t=1
Pr(Xk   Xq = xjT = t)Pr(T = t)
which becomes an integral of the corresponding density functions in the continuous time
limit
(7) z(x) =
1 Z
0
p()(xj)d =
1 Z
0
e
 (2+1)Ijxj(2)d
By using the identity [5]
(8)
1 Z
0
e
 ac I(bc)dc =
b   
a  
p
a2   b2
p
a2   b2
we arrive at the probability distribution of the signed distance
(9) z(x) =
1
p
4 + 1

2 + 1  
p
4 + 1
2
jxj
The individuals are at the same position with probability
(10) z  z(0) =
1
p
4 + 1
Distribution (9) is of course normalized
P1
x= 1 z(x) = 1, and its second moment is
(11)
1 X
x= 1
x
2z(x) = 2
Note that this second moment is twice the variance of the individual positions, which is
exactly  = 2Nv even for nite N (see Section 4.1). Hence the individuals stay together
in a cluster of size
p
2Nv. This cluster di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one follows the ancestral line of an individual time  back, its position ^ x() will change by
one at rate =2 in each direction. Consequently, the position of the cluster has a variance
proportional to time
(12) h^ x
2i =  = 2vt
which implies a diusive motion. The same result is valid for any nite N in the large time
limit. Note that the diusion coecient D = v does not depend on the population size.
Since the cluster itself wanders in space, the average number of individuals at any given site
goes to zero. That is why we focus on distances in the phenotype space (4).
2.2. Pair with same strategy. We are interested in the probability y that two randomly
chosen individuals have the same strategy. In the continuous time limit, strategy mutations
arrive at rate  on the ancestral lines of the two individuals. The two individuals have the
same strategy if there were no mutations, which is the case with probability e . Otherwise
there was at least one mutation, hence at least one of the players has a random strategy, so
they have the same strategy with probability 1=2. Consequently, the probability that two
players have the same strategy time  after their MRCA is
(13) y() = e
  +
1
2
 
1   e
 
The probability y that two randomly chosen individuals have the same strategy is
(14) y =
1 X
t=1
Pr(Sk = SqjT = t)Pr(T = t)
In the continuous time limit we obtain
(15) y =
1 Z
0
p()y()d =
2 + 
2(1 + )
where we have used (3) and (13).
2.3. Pair with same strategy and phenotype. The probability g that two randomly
chosen individuals have the same phenotype and also have the same strategy can be obtained
as
(16) g =
1 X
t=1
Pr(Sk = SqjT = t)Pr(Xk = XqjT = t)Pr(T = t)
Here we have used the property, that although g does not factorize in general, nevertheless
for any given time t the conditional probabilities factorize as
(17) Pr(Sk = Sq; Xk = XqjT = t) = Pr(Sk = SqjT = t)Pr(Xk = XqjT = t)
The reason is that mutations occur completely independently in the strategy and the phe-
notype space. The corresponding integral in the continuous time limit hence becomes
(18) g =
1 Z
0
p()y()(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where we use the notation ()  (0j). Note that it is also easy to obtain the analog
probability where the phenotype dierence is x, but we do not consider that here. Using
identity (8) again, we can evaluate the above integral
(19) g =
1
2
p
1 + 4
+
1
2
p
(1 + )(1 +  + 4)
2.4. Three point correlations. Now we turn to the calculation of the three point prob-
ability h which is dened in (1). If we follow the ancestral lines of three individuals back
in time, the probability that there was no coalescence event during one update step is
(1   1=N)(1   2=N). Two individuals coalesce with probability 3=N  (1   1=N). When
two individual have coalesced, the remaining two coalesce with probability 1=N during each
update step. Hence the probability that the rst merging happens to any pair of individuals
at time t3  1 back in time, and the second t2  1 before the rst one is
(20) Pr(t3;t2) =
3
N2

1  
1
N

1  
2
N
t3 1 
1  
1
N
t2
The probability that three individual coalesce simultaneously at time t3 is
(21) Pr(t3;0) =
1
N2

1  
1
N

1  
2
N
t3 1
In the N ! 1 limit (20) converges to the density function
(22) p(3;2) = 3e
 (33+2)
with 3 = t3=N and 2 = t2=N. Note that (21) does not aect the large N limit.
Let us call the scaled time when individuals q;k coalesce qk, and when k;l coalesce kl.
With probability 1=3 individuals q;k coalesce rst at qk = 3 and they coalesce with l at
kl = 3+2. Similarly with probability 1=3 individuals k;l coalesce rst at kl = 3 and they
coalesce with q at qk = 3 +2. If, however, l;q coalesce rst with probability 1/3, it makes
qk = kl = 3 + 2. Since we know the probability density y() that two individuals with a
MRCA at time  back have the same strategy (13), and the probability density ()  (0j)
that they are at the same position (5), we can simply obtain the three point correlation as
(23) h =
1
3
1 Z
0
d3
1 Z
0
d2 p(3;2)[(3)y(3 + 2) + (3 + 2)y(3) + (3 + 2)y(3 + 2)]
This integral can be evaluated by rst introducing a variable for 2+3 in the last two terms
of the integral, and by using identity (8) in all three terms. We obtain
(24) h =
(1 + )(3 + ) + C1(2 + )   C3
2(1 + )(2 + )
p
1 + 4
with the shorthand notation
(25) Ci =
1
2
s
(i + )(1 + 4)
i +  + 4
By now we have obtained all the correlations in (1) in the N ! 1 limit for any values of 
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3. Threshold b=c ratio
In this section the individuals play a simplied Prisoner's Dilemma game given by the
payo matrix
(26)
when playing against
C D
C b   c  c
payo of
D b 0
Here b > 0 is the benet gained from cooperators, and c > 0 is the cost payed by coopera-
tors. We assume that all individuals interact (in this sense the population is \well mixed").
Cooperators, however, play a conditional strategy: they cooperate with other individuals
who have the same phenotype, and they defect otherwise. Defectors always defect. The
total payo of an individual is the sum of all payos that individual receives. We introduce
the eective payo of an individual f = 1 +   payo, where  > 0 is the strength of the
selection, and  = 0 corresponds to the neutral case discussed in Section 2. Note that  must
be suciently small to make all tness values positive.
We consider here the simplest possible case, where each individual also receives a payo
from self interaction. Excluding self-interaction results in a 1=N correction, which is discussed
in Section 4.2. An extension to a general payo matrix is considered in Section 5.2.
3.1. Fitness. Let ni denote the number of players of phenotype i, and mi the number of
cooperators of phenotype i. A state of the system is given by the vectors s = (n;m). Let
fC;i and fD;i represent the (eective) payos of a cooperator and a defector, respectively, of
phenotype i. When self interaction is included these values are
fC;i = 1 +  [bmi   cni]
fD;i = 1 +  [bmi]:
(27)
Let wC;i and wD;i represent the tness (i.e. average number of osprings) of a cooperator
and a defector of phenotype i. After one update step (which is one generation) we obtain
wC;i =
NfC;i P
j[mjfC;j + (nj   mj)fD;j] (28)
Here a cooperator is chosen to be a parent with probability given by its payo relative to the
total payo, and this happens N times independently in one update step. The denominator
of (28) can be written as
(29)
X
j
[mjfC;j + (nj   mj)fD;j] = N + (b   c)
X
j
mjnj
Therefore, in the  ! 0 limit, we obtain the tness of a phenotype i cooperator
(30) wC;i = 1 + 
 
bmi   cni  
b   c
N
X
j
mjnj
!
+ O(
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3.2. Eect of selection. Let p denote the frequency of cooperators in the population.
Cooperation is favored if cooperators are in the majority at the stationary state, hpi > 1=2.
The frequency of cooperators p changes during one update step due to selection and due
to mutation. In any state s of the system, the total change of cooperator frequency can be
expressed in terms of the change due to selection as
(31) ptot(s) = (1   u)psel(s) + u

1
2
  p

Here the rst term describes the change due to selection in the absence of mutation, which
happens with probability 1   u. The second term stands for the eect of mutation, which
happens with probability u to each player independently. In this latter case the frequency p
increases in average by 1=2 due to the introduction of random strategies, and decreases by
p due to the replacement of cooperators.
In the stationary state hpi is constant, hence the total change of frequency vanishes
hpitot = 0. Then from (31) we can express the average cooperator frequency with the
change of frequency due to selection as
(32) hpi =
1
2
+
1   u
u
hpisel
This means that by calculating the average change of cooperator frequency, we also obtain
the average cooperator frequency. It also means that cooperators are favored hpi > 1=2 if
their change due to selection is positive in the stationary state
(33) hpisel > 0
Now let us perform a perturbative expansion for small selection   1. In a given state
s = (n;m), the expected change of p due to selection in one update step is
(34) p(s) =
1
N
 
X
i
miwC;i  
X
i
mi
!
This expression vanishes for  = 0 for the tness function (30). (Note that this statement is
not true in general for arbitrary models). Its Taylor expansion is
(35) p(s) = 0 + 
dp(s)
d

 
=0
+ O(
2) =

N
X
i
mi
dwC;i
d

 
=0
+ O(
2)
We also expand the stationary probabilities of nding the system in state s
(36) (s) = 
(0)(s) + 
(1)(s) + O(
2)
where (0)(s) is the stationary probability in the neutral state (here we consider two states
equivalent if they only dier by translation along the phenotype space). Consequently, in
the stationary state in the presence of the game, the average change in cooperator frequency
can be expressed in the leading order in terms of averages in the neutral stationary state
(37) hpisel =

N
*
X
i
mi
dwC;i
d
+
0
+ O(
2)
This expression has to be positive for cooperation to be favored (33). Here the 0 subscript
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hi0 =
P
s (0)(s). More generally, one can also easily obtain higher order terms in  based
on (35) and (36). The rst derivative of the eect of selection in the stationary state
(38) hpi
(1)
sel =
dhpisel
d
  
=0
can be obtained from (37), by using the tness (30) of our model, as
(39) hpi
(1)
sel =
1
N
2
4b
*
X
i
m
2
i
+
0
  c
*
X
i
mini
+
0
 
b   c
N
*
X
i;j
mimjnj
+
0
3
5
The threshold model parameters are then obtained when the change hpi
(1)
sel = 0, as follows
from the general condition (33)
(40)

b
c

=
h
P
i minii0   1
N
DP
i;j mimjnj
E
0
h
P
i m2
ii0   1
N
DP
i;j mimjnj
E
0
Hence, we have expressed the threshold b=c ratio in the small selection limit in terms of
correlations in the neutral stationary state. Note that the averages in (39) cannot be moved
inside the sum, since at any given position any stationary average is zero. Also note that all
terms in (40) are of order N2.
The above derivation is valid for nite N and  ! 0. We are also interested, however,
in the N ! 1 asymptotic behavior. In that case all the above derivation can be repeated
when simultaneously N ! 0.
Expression (39) for the change in cooperator frequency can be rewritten in a more intuitive
way. First we express the total payos of cooperators and defectors respectively as
fC =
X
i
mifC;i = NC + FC
fD =
X
i
mifD;i = ND + FD
(41)
in a given state, where FC and FD are the total payos without considering weak selection
(42) FC =
X
i
mi(bmi   cni); FD =
X
i
(ni   mi)bmi
and NC =
P
i mi and ND = N NC are the number of cooperators and defectors respectively.
With this notation the change in cooperator frequency (35) can be rewritten as
(43) p(s) =

N2 (NDFC   NCFD) + O(
2)
This expression was obtained in an intuitive way in the main text. By averaging over the
stationary state we of course recover (39).
3.3. Threshold value from correlations. Let us now evaluate the expected values in (40).
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(40) can be expressed in terms of probabilities in the neutral stationary state
*
X
i
m
2
i
+
0
= N
2 Pr(Sk = Sq = 1; Xk = Xq) (44a)
*
X
i
mini
+
0
= N
2 Pr(Sk = 1; Xk = Xq) (44b)
*
X
i;j
mimjnj
+
0
= N
3 Pr(Sl = Sk = 1; Xk = Xq) (44c)
The indices i and j refer to positions, while k;q and l refer to individuals. These identities
are self explanatory, nevertheless they are proven in Section 4.3.
Because the two strategies are equivalent in the neutral stationary state, all expressions
(44) remain valid when we change any 1 to 0. Consequently all expressions (44) simplify to
*
X
i
m
2
i
+
0
=
N2
2
Pr(Sk = Sq; Xk = Xq)
*
X
i
mini
+
0
=
N2
2
Pr(Xk = Xq)
*
X
i;j
mimjnj
+
0
=
N3
2
Pr(Sl = Sk; Xk = Xq)
(45)
Note that these probabilities are denoted in the main text as P2, P1, and P3 respectively.
Substituting the probabilities of (45) into (40) we arrive at the general condition expressed
in terms of two and three point correlations
(46)

b
c

=
Pr(Sl = Sk; Xk = Xq)   Pr(Xk = Xq)
Pr(Sl = Sk; Xk = Xq)   Pr(Sk = Sq; Xk = Xq)
In Section 2 we have calculated similar probabilities dened in (1), but always for two dif-
ferent individuals. In other words while in the probabilities of (45) we pick two individuals
with replacement, in the quantities of (1) two individuals were picked without replacement.
We know, however, that out of two individuals we pick the same individual twice with
probability 1=N, and pick two dierent individuals otherwise. We also know the correspond-
ing probabilities when picking three individuals. With this knowledge we can express the
probabilities with replacement in (45) with the probabilities without replacement in (1) as
follows
Pr(Sk = Sq; Xk = Xq) =
1
N
[(N   1)g + 1]
Pr(Xk = Xq) =
1
N
[(N   1)z + 1]
Pr(Sl = Sk; Xk = Xq) =
1
N2 [(N   1)(N   2)h + (N   1)(z + y + g) + 1]
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Figure 1. Exact threshold b=c ratio (50) in the N ! 1 limit for several
values of . Cooperation is most favored in the  ! 0 and  ! 1 limit,
where (b=c) = 1 + 2=
p
3.
Now we substitute these probabilities into condition (46) to obtain the threshold condition
(48)

b
c

=
(N   2)(z   h) + 1   y + z   g
(N   2)(g   h) + 1   y   z + g
The above condition (48) is exact for any nite N with self interaction. Without self inter-
action a O(1=N) correction appears as discussed in Section 4.2. The model of course makes
no sense for N = 1, and the smallest interesting population size is N = 2. In the N ! 1
limit of (48) we also obtain a simple rule
(49)

b
c

=
z   h
g   h
Substituting the expressions (10), (19), and (24) into the above equation for z, g, and h
respectively, we arrive at
(50)

b
c

=
C3   (2 + )C1 + (1 + )2
C3 + (2 + )C1   (1 + )
where we have used the shorthand notation (25). This is our main result: the exact threshold
b=c ratio in the N ! 1 and weak selection limit. For parameter values b=c > (b=c) there
are more cooperators than defectors in the system in the long time average.
In Figure 1, we plot the exact (b=c) ratio (50) as a function of  for several values of . One
observes that (b=c) gets smaller both for smaller  and for larger  . Hence small strategy
mutation and large phenotype mutation helps cooperation. The large  limit includes the
nite v (phenotype changing probability) case. Note that since the cluster size in phenotype
space is
p
2Nv, the average number of individuals with the same phenotype is proportional
to
p
N=v, hence there are plenty of individuals to interact with even for nite v values in
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In the  ! 1 limit (50) becomes
(51)

b
c

=
(2 + )
p
1 +    2(1 + )2   
p
3 + 
 (2 + )
p
1 +  + 2(1 + )   
p
3 + 
+ O(
1
p

)
which for  ! 0 behaves as
(52)

b
c

= 1 +
2
p
3
3
+ 
7
p
3   3
18
+ O(
2)
which is  2:16 in the leading order. For  ! 1 the threshold ratio (51) diverges as
(53)

b
c

=
p
 + 1 + O(
1
p

)
Conversely, in the  ! 0 limit (50) becomes
(54)

b
c

=
p
3(1 + 4)3=2 + (3 + 8)
p
3 + 4
p
3(1 + 4)3=2  
p
3 + 4
+ O()
This limit function diverges as 3=4 for small , but converges to the constant 1 + 2=
p
3
as  ! 1. Hence the best scenario for cooperation is  ! 0 and  ! 1 where (b=c) =
1 + 2=
p
3.
The large N asymptotic results are identical for the Moran process, where we choose a
random individual to die, and another (with replacement) to reproduce with probability
proportional to the player's payo (see Section 5.1).
We would like to briey comment on the relationship between our work and inclusive
tness or kin selection theory (see references in the main text). Let R be the inverse of the
r.h.s. of (46). Now we formally obtained Hamilton's rule (b=c) = 1=R. By dividing both
the numerator and the denominator in R by Pr(Xk = Xq), (we can assume that it is not
zero), and using the denition of conditional probability, we can rewrite R as
(55) R =
Pr(Sk = Sqj Xk = Xq)   Pr(Sl = Skj Xk = Xq)
1   Pr(Sl = Skj Xk = Xq)
Now with the notation
(56) G = Pr(Sk = Sqj Xk = Xq); G = Pr(Sl = Skj Xk = Xq)
we obtain R = (G   G)=(1   G), which is in the form of usual relatedness formula. Note,
however, that this G is not the probability of identity in state (IIS) between two random
individuals in the population as it usually is in inclusive tness theory. Instead, G is a sort
of weighted average of IIS probabilities in which those who share the same phenotype with
more players are assigned a larger weight.
4. Further clarifications
4.1. Finite populations for v = 1=2. Here we consider the Wright-Fisher (W-F) model for
nite N and v = 1=2. What makes this case simple is that at each time step all individuals
move. The probability that the time to the MRCA is t is given by (2). During t generations
there are exactly 2t birth events in the ancestry of two individuals, and in the v = 1=2 case
the phenotypic distance between two individuals follows a simple random walk with two
steps in phenotype space per one time unit. Consequently, the distance between two siblings
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same sub-lattice of even, and then odd sites. The distance distribution of two individuals k
and q, time t after their MRCA is
(57) Pr(Xk   Xq = xjT = t) = 2
 2t

2t
t + x=2

where again x is always even. Consequently the probability z(x) that two randomly chosen
individuals are at distance x apart can be obtained from (6)
(58) z(x) =
1
N   1
1 X
t=1

2t
t + x=2

N   1
4N
t
This sum can be evaluated using the identity
(59)
1 X
t=1

2t
t + x=2
a
4
t
=
(
a p
1 a(1+
p
1 a); x = 0
ajxj=2
p
1 a(1+
p
1 a)jxj; jxj  2
to obtain
(60) z(x) =
8
> > <
> > :
1
p
N + 1
x = 0
p
N
N   1

N   1
N + 2
p
N + 1
jxj=2
jxj  2
Hence, apart from the special x = 0 case, z(x) decays exponentially in x. For xed distances
and N ! 1 the asymptotic behavior is z(x) = 1=
p
N + O(1=N). The second moment of
the distance distribution (60) is simply 2N.
Now we turn to the strategies of the individuals. The strategies of the two players are the
same if no mutations happened during time t to either player, which is the case with probabil-
ity (1 u)2t. Otherwise the two strategies are the same with probability 1=2. Consequently,
the conditional probability is
(61) y(t) = (1   u)
2t +
1
2
[1   (1   u)
2t] =
1 + Ut
2
where we introduce the shorthand notations
(62) U = (1   u)
2 ; M = N(1   U) + U
The probability y that two randomly chosen individuals have the same strategy becomes
(63) y =
1 X
t=1
p(t)y(t) =
1
2

1 +
U
M

where we have used (2) and (61).
Similarly, using (16) we obtain the probability g that two randomly chosen individuals
have both the same strategy and the same phenotype
(64) g =
1
2(
p
N + 1)
+
U
2
p
M
p
N +
p
M

These are exact results for arbitrary number of individuals N and mutation rate u. In the
N ! 1 and u ! 0 limit of the formulas (60), (63) and (64) with  = 2Nu kept constant,
we recover the  ! 1 limits of the corresponding formulas (9), (15) and (19), apart from
a factor two. This factor two is a peculiarity of the v = 1=2 case. Since here the distanceEVOLUTION OF COOPERATION BY PHENOTYPIC SIMILARITY 13
between individuals is always even, there must be twice as many players at a given even
distance. Note also that the variance of the cluster is 2 both for v = 1=2 and for the
continuous limit calculation.
For only two individuals, the general condition (48) simplies to
(65)

b
c

N=2
=
1   y + z   g
1   y   z + g
which contains only quantities we have just calculated in this section. To obtain the exact
(b=c) for any other nite N we have to use the general expression (48), and obtain h anal-
ogously to (23) and using (20) and (21). The formulas for h and (b=c) are too cumbersome
to include here. We have, however, checked these formulas with computer simulations for
many values of N. We explicitly simulated the W-F process and found the threshold (b=c)
value where the frequency of cooperators in the stationary state becomes larger than 1=2.
Moreover, in the N ! 1, u ! 0 limit with  = 2Nu constant, we recover the continuous
time formula (51).
4.2. Excluding self interaction. If cooperators cannot interact with themselves, we have
fC;i = 1 +  [b(mi   1)   c(ni   1)]
fD;i = 1 +  [bmi]:
(66)
Therefore the tness of cooperators at position i becomes
wC;i = 1 +

N
 
b(mi   1)   c(ni   1)  
b   c
N
X
j
mj(nj   1)
!
+ O(
2) (67)
which then leads to the expected change of cooperator frequency
hpi =

N2
"
b
*
X
i
m
2
i
+
  c
*
X
i
mini
+
 
b   c
N
*
X
i;j
mimjnj
+
  (b   c)
*
X
i
mi
+
+
b   c
N
*
X
i;j
mimj
+#
+ O(
2):
(68)
Two new correlation types in the neutral stationary state appear
*
X
i
mi
+
= N Pr(Sk = 1) =
N
2
*
X
i;j
mimj
+
= N
2 Pr(Sk = Sq = 1) =
N2
2
y
(69)
This then leads to the general expression analogous to (48) for the threshold ratio
(70)

b
c

=
(N   2)(z   h) + z   g
(N   2)(g   h)   z + g
The smallest valid population size is N = 3. In the N ! 1 the threshold b=c ratio with
self interaction (48) and without it (70) are the same (49) in the leading order, and their
di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4.3. From averages to correlations. Here we obtain the identities listed in (44). The
variables mi and ni are xed in any given state. Let us use the indicator function 1, which
is 1(A) = 1 if event A is true and 1(A) = 0 if event A is false. Of course the stationary
average of the indicator function is the stationary probability of an event
(71) h1(A)i = Pr(A)
and by 1(A;B) we mean 1(A \ B) = 1(A)1(B). Now in any given state we can express ni
and mi by the indicator functions
ni =
X
k
1(Xk = i)
mi =
X
q
1(Xq = i)1(Sq = 1):
(72)
The sum in (44a) becomes
(73)
X
i
mimi =
X
k;q
"
1(Sk = 1)1(Sq = 1)
X
i
1(Xk = i)1(Xq = i)
#
=
X
k;q
1(Sk = Sq = 1)1(Xk = Xq)
since the sum over i is simply
(74)
X
i
1(Xk = i)1(Xq = i) =
X
i
1(Xk = i; Xq = i) = 1(Xk = Xq):
Now taking the average of (73) in the stationary state we obtain
(75)
*
X
i
m
2
i
+
0
=
X
k;q
h1(Sk = Sq = 1; Xk = Xq)i =
X
k;q
Pr(Sk = Sq = 1; Xk = Xq);
where we have used identity (71). Since all individuals are equivalent in the stationary
state, the above probabilities are the same for any pair of individuals, hence from now on
we consider k and q as two randomly chosen individuals, and write
(76)
*
X
i
m
2
i
+
0
= N
2 Pr(Sk = Sq = 1; Xk = Xq):
The expression (44b) can be derived similarly, since
(77)
X
i
mini =
X
k;q
"
1(Sq = 1)
X
i
1(Xk = i)1(Xq = i)
#
=
X
k;q
1(Sq = 1)1(Xk = Xq)
and taking the average of (77) in the stationary state leads to
(78)
*
X
i
mini
+
0
=
X
k;q
Pr(Sq = 1;Xk = Xq) = N
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For the last expression (44c) we have
X
i;j
mimjnj =
X
k;q;l
"
X
i
1(Sl = 1;Xl = i)
#"
X
j
1(Sk = 1;Xk = j)1(Xq = j)
#
=
X
k;q;l
1(Sl = 1) 1(Sk = 1; Xk = Xq)
(79)
which in the stationary state becomes
(80)
*
X
i;j
mimjnj
+
0
=
X
k;q;l
Pr(Sl = Sk = 1; Xk = Xq) = N
3 Pr(Sl = Sk = 1; Xk = Xq)
5. Outlook
5.1. Moran dynamics. In the Moran model we chose a random individual to die, and
another (with replacement) to multiply with probability proportional to the player's payo.
The newborn then replaces the dead individual. Otherwise the dynamics is the same as in
the W-F case. The behavior of the Moran model is also very similar to the W-F model,
and the results can be written in an identical form in the N ! 1 limit, by dening the
appropriate variables.
We consider the neutral case of the Moran model rst. Let us obtain the probability
Pr(T = t) that the time to the most recent common ancestor (MRCA) of two randomly
chosen individual is T = t. Let us calculate the probability PCA that they had a common
ancestor one update step before. It could happen only if the parent and the dying individuals
were dierent, which happens with probability 1   1=N. Then our two individuals have a
common ancestor if one of them is the parent and the other is the newborn daughter, which
has a probability 2 1
N
1
N 1. Hence having a common ancestor in the previous update step is
(81) PCA =

1  
1
N

 2 
1
N

1
N   1
=
2
N2
Consequently the probability that the MRCA is exactly time T = t backward is
(82) Pr(T = t) = (1   PCA)
t 1PCA =

1  
2
N2
t 1 2
N2
If we introduce a rescaled time  = t=(N2=2), then in the N ! 1 limit the coalescent time
distribution (82) converges to the same density function (3) as we obtained for the W-F
model.
Since in our model mutations (in strategies) and motion only happen at birth events, let
us investigate the statistics of birth events in the Moran model. As we follow the ancestral
lines of two randomly chosen individuals backward in time, we can obtain the probability
PB that a birth event happens in one update step, but the ancestral lines do not coalesce.
In other words, PB is the probability that at a given time one of the two individuals is the
daughter but the other is not the parent. If the parent dies during this update step (which
happens with probability 1=N) one individual is the daughter with probability 2=N (and
the other individual cannot be the parent). If the parent does not die (which happens with
probability 1   1=N) one of the individuals is the daughter and the other is not the parent16 TIBOR ANTAL, HISASHI OHTSUKI, JOHN WAKELEY, PETER D. TAYLOR, MARTIN A. NOWAK
with probability 2=N (N  2)=(N  1). Hence the probability that there is a birth event in
the ancestry of either individual during one elementary time step is
(83) PB =

1  
1
N


2
N

N   2
N   1
+
1
N

2
N
=
2(N   1)
N2
In the continuous time limit with  = t=(N2=2), a birth event happens at rate N. Con-
sequently a mutation happens at rate  = Nu on the ancestral line of two individuals.
Similarly, one of the two individual hops at rate  = Nv in each direction. In other words
the distance between the two individuals changes at rate  in each direction. This means
that the continuous time (N ! 1) descriptions of the Moran and the W-F models are the
same, but N must be used for the Moran and 2N for the W-F model in the denition of 
and . Hence all N ! 1 results of Section 2 are also valid for the Moran model. (Note that
the diusion coecient of the cluster is D = v=N.)
All formulas of Section 3 are almost identical to those for W-F model. The average
frequency of cooperators depends on the change of cooperators very similarly to (32)
(84) hpi =
1
2
+ N
1   u
u
hpisel
Instead of the tness of the W-F model (28), we have a very similar expression for the tness
after one elementary step
wC;i =
N   1
N
+
fC;i P
j[mjfC;j + (nj   mj)fD;j] (85)
where the payos are again given by (27). Here the rst term corresponds to the cooperator
staying alive, and to second to it being chosen for reproduction. In the  ! 0 limit (85)
becomes
(86) wC;i = 1 +

N
 
bmi   cni  
b   c
N
X
j
mjnj
!
+ O(
2)
Note that this is exactly the tness of the W-F process (30) with a scaled selection strength
0 = =N. Hence all results of Section 3, and in particular the citical b=c ratio (50) are also
valid for the Moran model.
5.2. General payo matrix. Instead of the payo matrix (26) of the simplied Prisoner's
Dilemma (PD) game, we study now a general payo matrix
(87)

R S
T P

A similar derivation to the one presented in Section 3 leads to the condition for cooperation
(88) (R   S)g + (S   P)z > (R   S   T + P) + (S + T   2P)h
in the N ! 1 limit, which is the analogous formula to (49). Here a new type of three point
correlation must be introduced
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Figure 2. \Snow drift", \Stag hunt" and \Prisoner's dilemma" games corre-
spond to three distinct regions in the (;) plane, bounded by black lines. The
red (thick) line (94) marks the boundary between defection (yellow-shaded)
and cooperation (white). The blue (thicker dashed) lines depict the corre-
sponding simplied payo matrices.
In the  ! 1 and  ! 0 limit the correlations are
(90)
z =
1
2
p

g =
1
2
p


1  

4

h =
1
2
p

 
1   
2 +
p
3
8
!
 =
1
2
p

 
1   
3 +
p
3
8
!
up to O(1=) and O(2) terms. Here z, g, and h were obtained as limits of the general
expressions (10), (19), and (24) respectively. The value of  was derived analogously to (23).
By substituting these correlations into (88) we nally arrive at the general condition for
cooperation
(91) T   S < (R   P)(1 +
p
3)
For the simplied PD game (26) we recover (52) in the leading order.
For a non-degenerate payo matrix, with the exchange of players R > P can always be
achieved. Then under weak selection one can dene an equivalent matrix
(92)

1 
1 +  0

with only two parameters
(93)  =
S   P
R   P
;  =
T   R
R   P18 TIBOR ANTAL, HISASHI OHTSUKI, JOHN WAKELEY, PETER D. TAYLOR, MARTIN A. NOWAK
In these variables the condition for cooperation (91) becomes
(94)  <  +
p
3
which describes a straight threshold line in the (;) plane (see Figure 2).
In Figure 2 we show how this threshold line (94) divides the (;) plane into a cooperative
and a defective half plane. Three regions, bounded by black lines, correspond to the \Snow
drift", the \Stag hunt" and the \Prisoner's dilemma" games. The blue straight lines on the
(;) plane correspond to the following representative simplied payo matrixes
(95)
Snow drift

b   c=2 b   c
b 0

 = 1   , with 0 <  < 1
Stag hunt

b   c  c
0 0

 =  1, with  < 0
Prisoner's dilemma

b   c  c
b 0

 =  , with  < 0
Form the general condition (91) we can deduce the condition for cooperation for these sim-
plied games. There is always cooperation in the simplied Snow drift game. Cooperation
is favored in the simplied Stag hunt game only for b=c > 1 + 1=(1 +
p
3). In the simplied
PD game cooperators win for b=c > 1 + 2=
p
3 in agreement with (52).
5.3. Randomly changing phenotypes. Here we replace the one-dimensional phenotype
space with an innite-dimensional phenotype space. We do not model the number of di-
mensions explicitly, but simply assume that every mutation causes a jump to a new unique
phenotype. Now the only way that two individuals can have the same phenotype is if there
are no phenotypic mutations in their ancestry back to the time of their most recent common
ancestor. This property is called identity by descent in population genetics and this mutation
model known as the innitely-many-alleles, or simply innite-alleles, mutation model [6, 7].
Let ~ v be the probability that the phenotype of an ospring diers from that of its parent.
Note that in the one-dimensional model, there is a mutation probability of v in each direction.
As before, in the limiting (N ! 1) model with time rescaled appropriately, the phenotypic
mutation rate to two individuals is equal to . In the Wright-Fisher model we have 2N~ v ! 
(and N~ v !  in the Moran model), where the arrows correspond to the limit N ! 1. The
denition of  = 2Nu in the Wright-Fisher model ( = Nu in the Moran model) is the same
as before.
Given a coalescence time  between a pair of individuals,
(96) () = e
 
is the probability that they have the same phenotype. Therefore, in the N ! 1 limit, the
correlations dened in (1) become
z =
1
1 + 
g =
1
2

1
1 + 
+
1
1 +  + 

h =
1
2

1
1 + 
+
1
3 +  + 

1
1 + 
+
1
1 + 
+
1
1 +  + 

(97)EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION BY PHENOTYPIC SIMILARITY 19
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 0  2  4  6  8  10
(
b
/
c
)
*
µ
ν = 1
ν = 2
ν = 4
ν = ∞
Figure 3. Exact threshold b=c ratio (98) for randomly changing phenotypes
for N ! 1. Cooperation is most favored in the  ! 1 limit, where (b=c) =
1. Note that the lines for nite values of  are not straight.
The calculation goes analogously to that of Section 2. The threshold parameters (49) for
cooperation to be favored becomes
(98)

b
c

=
(3 + 2 + ) + (1 + )(3 + )
(2 +  + )
This is plotted in Figure 3, which can be compared to the corresponding Figure 1 for the
one-dimensional model.
Cooperation is most favored when  is large because in this case two individuals that share
the same phenotype will almost surely have the same strategy. We have
(99)

b
c

= 1 +
1 + 

+ O(
 2)
In the  ! 1 limit, (b=c) = 1, i.e. cooperation is favored whenever the benet b from
cooperation is larger than the cost c.
For general payo matrices (87), we restrict our calculation to the  ! 0 limit. The
calculation is completely analogous to that of Section 5.2. First we calculate the three point
correlation , which is dened in (89). Up to rst order in  we obtain
(100)  =
1
1 + 

1   
9 + 7 + 22
4(1 + )(3 + )

Substituting this expression together with (97) into the general condition (88) for coopera-
tion, we nally obtain
(101) T   S < (R   P)
(1 + )(3 + 2)
3 + 20 TIBOR ANTAL, HISASHI OHTSUKI, JOHN WAKELEY, PETER D. TAYLOR, MARTIN A. NOWAK
This result is valid for general values of . For  ! 0 condition (101) becomes T  S < R P,
while in the  ! 1 limit it is simply R > P.
By using the scaled variables , , introduced in (92), condition (101) is again a straight
line in the (;) plane. For  ! 0 there is no cooperation in the PD region (see this region
in Figure 2), but for  ! 1 the whole plane corresponds to cooperation.
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T
he advantage of mutual help is
threatened by defectors, who
exploit the benefits provided by
others without providing bene-
fits in return. Cooperation can only be
sustained if it is preferentially channeled
toward cooperators and away from de-
fectors. But how? A deceptively simple
idea is to distinguish cooperators from
defectors by tagging them. It clearly is
in the interest of cooperators to use
some distinctive cue to assort with their
like. Such an assortment, however, con-
flicts with the interests of the cheaters,
who have every incentive to also acquire
that tag. This makes for an inherently
unstable situation. The history of evolu-
tionary thinking on this issue is long. An
article in this issue of PNAS by Antal et
al. (1) opens new ground by providing
an in-depth analysis of a selection-
mutation model.
The first to investigate a tag for altru-
ism was W. D. Hamilton (2). He con-
ceived what he called a supergene, able
to produce (i) a distinctive phenotypic
trait, (ii) the faculty to recognize the
trait in others, and (iii) the propensity to
direct benefits toward bearers of that
trait, even though this entails a fitness
cost. Soon afterward, Richard Dawkins
described Hamilton’s thought experi-
ment by using as phenotypic trait the
fanciful example of a green beard. The
supergene was now termed ‘‘green
beard gene,’’ in part to acknowledge its
inherent unlikelihood. ‘‘Too good to be
true,’’ were Dawkins’ words (3): for the
gene would have to be able to program
for 3 effects, namely the feature, its rec-
ognition, and the altruistic propensity.
The green-beard concept relates to
both major approaches to cooperation
in evolutionary biology, namely kin se-
lection (2) and reciprocal altruism (4). It
helps in promoting assortment between
cooperators; as a result, cooperators can
get more than they give, so that altruism
becomes a thriving business. Because
wearers of green beards both confer and
receive benefits, the tag works as a kind
of promise that the altruistic action will
be returned, not necessarily by the re-
cipient, but by another member of the
green-bearded guild. In this sense, the
green beard mediates an indirect form
of reciprocation, through third parties.
In the usual models of indirect reciproc-
ity, ‘‘good guys’’ are recognized by their
reputation, which is based on their past
deeds (5). Here, however, recognition is
ensured by a phenotypic trait, which is a
less sophisticated (and possibly less reli-
able) signal.
Mostly, the green beard is studied in
the context of kin selection. If you carry
a green beard, your relatives are likely
to carry one, too. Directing benefits at
green-bearded individuals confers the
benefits preferentially to your kin and
raises your indirect fitness (because your
kin shares your genes with a higher-
than-average probability). In many
cases, kin are living close by. But the
viscosity of the population (to use an-
other term by Hamilton) is not enough
to guarantee a local increase in coopera-
tion, because it is counterbalanced by a
local increase in competition. Limited
dispersal alone is therefore not enough.
A gene for kin recognition can help to
direct positive rather than negative ef-
fects toward relatives. But it is impor-
tant to realize that the green beard can
promote altruism beyond the realm of
the family.
Some 10 years ago, it was found that
green beards are not as implausible as
their name suggests. In particular, Haig
(6) remarked that genes for homophilic
cell adhesion could perform all 3 tasks
required from a green-beard gene (trait,
recognition, and action) by coding for a
surface protein that allows them to stick
to copies of themselves on other cells. A
few years later, it was found that csA
genes in Dictyostelium discoideum fit the
bill (7). In hard times, these amoeba
literally stick together to form stalks for
dispersing their spores. A similar gene
has also been discovered in flocculating
yeast cells (8). Other candidates for
more sophisticated green-beard effects
have been found in ants and lizards.
An obvious way to cheat is to grow a
green beard but skip the altruism. For
homophilic cell adhesion, this seems
barely feasible. In other examples,
cheating may be prevented by genetic
constraints. But in principle, one would
expect that a tight link between a gene
for altruistic behavior and a gene for tag
recognition will ultimately be broken,
and cooperation be destroyed. Surpris-
ingly, it turned out that if the link is not
too tight (but not too loose either), a
dynamic regime of cooperation can
emerge, based on tag diversity. When-
ever some tag becomes too frequent, it
can be faked by defectors, but coopera-
tive behavior subsists nevertheless, by
allying itself with another tag. This phe-
nomenon has been termed ‘‘beard chro-
modynamics,’’ to suggest that green
beards can over time be replaced by red,
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Fig. 1. Face transitions. Players in a game theoretic experiment are provided with pictures of their
partnerswho,throughdigitalsorcery,aremadetolooklikethemselves,toagreaterorlesserextent.Here,
thefaceinthemiddleistheresultofa60:40mixoftheother2faces.Playerspreferentiallytrustcoplayers
who look more like themselves. Thus, familiarity enhances trust. With permission from Lisa DeBruine, see
ref. 14.
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nals for cooperators (9, 10).
The underlying principle is that of a
shibboleth, or secret handshake. But
such a specially-contrived trait, evolved
for the purpose of signaling cooperation,
is not always necessary.
Tag-based cooperation can also rely
on self-similarity. All that is needed is
some general means to recognize what
is like yourself and what is not, i.e., to
distinguish ‘‘us’’ from ‘‘them.’’
With familiars, you need no badge, or
password. This has been called the
‘‘armpit effect’’ (by Dawkins see ref. 3).
Although an obvious variation of the
green-beard principle could mediate, in
principle, symbiosis between 2 different
species, the armpit effect is self-referen-
tial. You need not sprout a special rec-
ognition device but simply check
whether the other looks, smells, or
sounds like you.
Mechanisms based on self-similarity
are commonly used among cells of an
organism or among members of a spe-
cies. Kin recognition seems widespread:
it is useful, not only for promoting nep-
otism, but also for avoiding incest (11).
Bats or birds recognize their offspring
on crowded cave roofs and cliff faces
through vocalizations; hamsters and
wasps pick up the odor of their nest or
colony, etc. Interestingly, these faculties
seem always acquired through imprint-
ing, rather than genetically encoded.
Thus, they indicate in-group rather than
kin. This use of associative learning is
well supported by theory (12).
An armpit effect has been recently
found in hamsters (13). Self-similarity
appears to work in humans, too: we like
our like. Neat economic experiments
show that players preferentially trust
similar-looking coplayers (14) (Fig. 1).
(The players are provided with pictures
of their ostensible partners, and these
photos are manipulated to look to a
greater or lesser degree like them-
selves). Clearly, such cues for self-simi-
larity can be enhanced by cultural
means. Many groups provide their mem-
bers with characteristic uniforms,
badges, tattoos, ties, haircuts, hangouts,
accents, musical tastes, or slang idioms.
In most tag-based models, the tags
are discrete; you either look like me or
you do not. In general, defectors can be
overcome only for a restricted range of
recombination between tag and behav-
ior (cf. refs. 15–17). However, similarity
is likely to be a question of degree; you
can look more or less like me. In the
case of continuous graduation, it is
likely that cooperative behavior is ad-
dressed toward all those who are tolera-
bly similar.
Such models show intriguing patterns:
cliques of similar cooperators grow, are
beset and undermined by defectors, and
regroup around other phenotypes (18,
19). Extending tolerance to a larger
range of tag values enlarges the basis of
collaboration, whereas restricting toler-
ance shields from exploiters: this leads
to endlessly fluctuating ‘‘tides of
tolerance’’ (20).
In the model of Antal et al. (1), mem-
bers of a well-mixed population of con-
stant size N are distinguished by a tag
that can take infinitely many values and
is coded by integers.
Defectors help nobody, and coopera-
tors provide help exclusively to members
of their own tag group. From time to
time, individuals produce offspring in
numbers proportional to their fitness.
Some N of these offspring are randomly
chosen to form the next generation. Off-
spring inherit from their parent both
their behavior (cooperator or defector)
and their tag, up to mutation. Each con-
figuration of the population is specified
by the number of defectors and cooper-
ators for each tag. The expected payoff
values for defectors and cooperators can
easily be computed in terms of condi-
tional probabilities (e.g., for defectors to
interact with cooperators, etc.). This
specifies the configurations for which
cooperators are sufficiently assorted
with other cooperators to earn more
than defectors do. But the configura-
tions move and cluster in a very fluid
manner through the range of possible
tags. It needs considerable mathematical
dexterity to average the payoffs over all
configurations in the stationary state.
This yields, under the limiting assump-
tion of weak selection, a condition for
cooperators to be more frequent than
defectors in the long term, requiring
that the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a
specific threshold. Under the most fa-
vorable conditions, i.e., when mutations
between tags are frequent and muta-
tions in the behavior rare, that threshold
is slightly larger than 2. In contrast to
previous models (9, 15, 16), no addi-
tional requirements on spatial popula-
tion distribution are used. The analysis
of several limiting cases shows that the
results depend significantly on mutation
structure, about which empirical data
are lacking at present. The elusive na-
ture of the game of hide and seek be-
tween cooperators and defectors, an
age-long spur for biological and cultural
evolution, continues to challenge experi-
mentalists and theoreticians alike.
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